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1Managing natural resources in the Pacific Islands*
Satish Chand
Introduction
Pacific Island Countries (PICs) are heavily dependent on natural resources and likely to
remain so for the near future, making resource management an issue of critical
importance for economic development.  This chapter employs a simple neoclassical
growth model to diagnose deficiencies in current policy regimes and suggest possible
alternatives.  Current practices in the exploitation of the regions mineral, tuna, and forest
resources are used to illustrate problems and suggest possible policy interventions.
Resource dependence in the PICs, though diverse, is high relative to economies with
similar levels of per-capita income.  Table 1 shows both the diversity and extent of this
dependence.  For example, the average area of land available on a per-capita basis ranges
from less than 0.2 hectares in Nauru to 13 in Niue.  When the fertility and terrain of this
land is allowed for, this diversity increases even further.  The coral atolls such as Tuvalu
are extremely poor in terms of agricultural land.  The dependence on land given the large
subsistence sector is already high in several PICs.  Moreover the rapid population growth
(exceeding 3 percent per annum in Solomon Islands and Marshall Islands) is increasing
pressures on the meagre land resources in some of these countries.
In contrast to the small land resources, the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the PICs
are considerable.  These offer untapped wealth in the form of marine resources including
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2the potential for mineral discoveries on the seabed, and therefore offer potential for
economic development, if used wisely.  As the data in Table 1 demonstrates, the PICs
have EEZs that range from seven times the landmass in Papua New Guinea to in excess
of 15,000 times for Nauru.
Natural resources dependence within the PICs is likely to increase within the short to
medium term due to rapidly increasing populations in a climate of sluggish economic
activity.  More than fifty percent of the population is dependent on subsistence
agriculture, this dependence – though declining – is not likely to fall quickly.  Private
industry will take a considerable while to establish and grow to provide employment for
the bulk of the population.  This chapter addresses one important issue of efficient use of
natural resources for economic development by comparing current practice with the
ideals drawn from a simple neoclassical growth model.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows.  The next section sets the context by
providing a brief survey of the economic performance of and extent of resource
dependence in the PICs.  Section 3 presents a simple neoclassical growth model that
treats natural resources as capital; such treatment provides conditions for efficient use of
such capital.  Three specific cases, for mining, fishing, and logging are considered next to
highlight deficiencies in current resource management practice. Lessons for policy
interventions and conclusion bring the chapter to a close.
3Economic performance and resource dependence in PICs
The 14 Pacific Island economies are diverse on all counts except for their poor economic
performance over the past two decades.  The data in Table 5.2 shows that the 14 nations
that comprise the countries of the South Pacific have considerable diversity in terms of a
number of economic attributes.  Population size ranges from a low of 2000 for Niue to in
excess of 5 million for PNG.  Per-capita GDP ranges from $US594 for Kiribati to $US6,
448 for Palau.  Life expectancy is equally diverse; ranging from a low of 58.2 years in
Papua New Guinea to 73 years in Fiji.  Similarly, aid flows range from $US4, 814 per
capita in Palau or around 75 percent of per-capita GDP to $US46 per capita in Fiji or
around 2 percent of per capita GDP
Annual per-capita growth in GDP, taken over the 14-year period from 1982 to 1996 ( a
period for which consistent data from the World Bank are available) has ranged from a
maximum of 2 percent for Papua New Guinea to less than one percent for Fiji, Samoa,
and Vanuatu.  Furthermore, the growth rates between years have gyrated wildly, in part
because of weather conditions, including natural disasters such as cyclones, which
determine agricultural production.  Of late, political problems such as those in Fiji, Papua
New Guinea, and Solomon Islands have adversely affected investment, led to out-
migration of skilled and professional labour, reduced tourist arrivals, and in turn lowered
aggregate income.
Resource dependence in all of the PICs is high.  For example, more than half and in the
case of Papua New Guinea four-fifths of the population depend on the subsistence sector.
Agriculture and inshore fisheries account for more than half of total employment, while
4primary sector exports account for up to 93 percent of total merchandise exports.  Exports
of copra, fish, minerals, sugar, and timber remain the major foreign exchange earners,
albeit in differing orders in the individual PICs.  For example, the forestry sector in the
Solomon Islands earned over US$8.5million in 1999, equivalent to nearly 50 percent of
total national export earnings.  The secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy often
depend on inputs from the primary sector for their viability.  For example, the large sugar
milling in Fiji is totally dependent on sugarcane production while log exports from
Solomon Islands are due to their rich and rapidly depleting native forests.  The growing
tourism industry in the PICs is due to the natural heritage, including the scenic beauty and
lack of industrial pollutants.  These resources, unless well managed, cannot be assumed
to last indefinitely.
Population pressures are likely to exacerbate existing demands on natural resources.  For
example, rising village populations in Fiji are leading to demands for return of land either
leased for agriculture or held by the state.  Similar problems in Solomon Islands
emanating from competition for land between the immigrants from the outer islands and
the original residents of Guadacanal led to a civil conflict with catastrophic consequences
for the national economy.
If these pressures on natural resource use are left unchecked, the current levels of output
are not likely to be sustained for the foreseeable future.  For example, there are
widespread reports that current levels of logging in parts of Papua New Guinea and all of
Solomon Islands are far in excess of their regenerative capacity.  Similar claims are being
5made for the rate of harvest of one tuna species, the big-eye (see Petersen in this volume).
Soil erosion and land degradation are lowering yields as well as clogging-up many of the
river systems in many of the volcanic islands.  Amongst the coral atolls including
Kiribati, waste disposal into the lagoons is rendering the fish and shellfish caught there as
being unsafe for human consumption (Duncan and Temu, 1997; Hunt, 1998).
In summary, many of the resource endowments of the PICs are fragile and therefore
require careful management to ensure that their contribution to development is
maximised.  Here, natural resources are treated as capital within a growth framework to
maximise net national product (NNP), the last being net of the value of resources
liquidated in producing output.
Natural resources as capital
Treating natural resources as capital within a standard growth model allows derivation of
necessary conditions for efficient resource use.  Here, one such model (Hartwick, 1990)
is used in making some standard propositions on management of natural resources.  The
case of exhaustible resources is considered first and ahead of that for renewable
resources.
Consider optimal growth in an economy that maximises the discounted utilitarian utility
function of the form
(1) dteCU tr-
¥
ò
0
)( ,
6where r is the social discount rate, t denotes time, C is the level of aggregate
consumption, and U(.) is the aggregate instantaneous utility function, subject to the
following two budget constraints
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Where K is the stock of produced capital, L the current labour force, R the current flow
from stock S of exhaustible resources, F(.) is the aggregate production function for the
manufactured output, f(.) is the current cost of resource extraction – defined in terms of
the produced good – and g(.) is the cost of exploration – again defined in terms of the
produced good.  The marginal conditions, fR and gD, provide the marginal cost – in terms
of the produced good – of extraction R and new discoveries D given stock S.
The current value Hamiltonian from this maximisation problem is
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with f and y being the two costate variables for the respective state variables K&  and S& .
The solution to (4) is characterised by the following four conditions:
(5a) )(tUC f= ;
(5b) DRR gfF ==- f
y
;
(5c)
h
r
r
f
f ][
][
-
=Û=-= K
C
C
K
F
C
C
U
U
F
&&&
, 
C
CC
U
U
C-=h ;1 and,
(5d) ryfy =+- ][ SS gf& .
                                                                
1 h is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption.
7In the context of this simple model, the above four conditions constitute the necessary
conditions for efficient extraction of a non-renewable natural resource.  The intuition for
each of these four conditions that are necessary for maximisation of equation (4) is as
follows.  The first states that the marginal utility of consumption has to equal its shadow
price.  The second states the familiar result that rents from the resource are invested in
regenerating the capital. This condition can be interpreted as the Hartwick-rule where
resource rents are invested in finding new resources and/or in other income generating
activities.  We could expand this interpretation by allowing substitutability between types
of resources and K such that this savings-rule ensures that the aggregate stock of capital
inclusive of natural resources is protected from falling for this economy.  The third
condition shows that in steady state, the marginal product of produced capital is just
equal to the social discount rate.  The last condition ensures that the resource is extracted
efficiently over time.  This may be expressed as the asset equilibrium condition; the left-
hand-side of the equality shows the appreciation in value from not extracting the
marginal unit of the resource while the right-hand-side represents the opportunity cost of
such a decision.  This is a restatement of Hotelling’s rule, which shows that the shadow
price of the resource should rise at the rate of the discount rate plus the added costs from
net depletion of stock.  Resource rents exist in this framework due to the scarcity of the
resource.
The above enumerated conditions provide the benchmark against which current practices
of resource management can be assessed.  The framework is later expanded to
8incorporate renewable resources and composite capital goods inclusive of all natural and
reproducible capital; the latter assumption enables substitution between specific types of
resources.  Allowing for such substitution possibilities enables greater flexibility in
achieving the condition stated as (5b) above.
We can also expand the framework to provide a means of calculating the net national
product (NNP), i.e. net of changes in the stock of natural resources.  Hartwick (1990)
provides such a framework by using a linear approximation to U(.) (@ UC.C) and
condition (5a) to express the current value Hamiltonian in (4) as
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where NNP is now the sum of consumption, investment, and changes to the net stock of
the natural resource valued at its rental price.  The national product, as depicted by
equation (6), can be derived by subtracting the rents associated with the (net) depletion of
the natural resource from its Standard National Accounts (SNA) counterpart.  We report
on one such attempt, for Papua New Guinea, in the next section.
In the case of renewable resources such as fish and forests, the analog to (6) is
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where all terms are as defined above with E now denoting the rate of extraction of the
renewable resource that directly provides utility, fE is the marginal cost of extraction,
UE/UF is the market price of the resource (fish) under competitive conditions, and Z&
9denotes the increase in the stock of the renewable resource.  Equation (6) is implemented
in estimating the NNP for the PNG mining sector next.
Three specific examples of resource management in the PICs
 i. The case of mining in PNG
Mining is a case of non-renewable resource extraction; this being consistent with the
assumptions leading to the necessary conditions for efficient resource extraction as listed
by the four conditions in equations (5a) to (5d) above.  Papua New Guinea provides a
good case to test adherence to condition (6) for three reasons: first, a case study
(Bartelmus et al, 1993) employing an integrated environmental and economic accounting
framework, as provided under the guidelines of the United Nations Statistics Office, is
available; second, amongst the PICs, Papua New Guinea has the largest and most
developed mining sector; and third, Papua New Guinea is regarded as the most
progressive of the PICs in environmental management and conservation.  On the last, the
PNG constitution states that the country’s “natural resources and environment are to be
used for the collective benefit of future generations”; the extent to which such a condition
has been fulfilled remains debatable.
As of 1999, revenues from exports of crude oil, gold, and copper amounted to 3.524
billion kina, equivalent to approximately 71 percent of total exports.  For the decade
commencing 1990, the country exported a total of 1.65 billion tons of copper and 541
tons of gold.  Another 2.7 billion barrels of crude oil has been exported since production
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commenced in 1992.2  This depletion needs to be taken into account in a comprehensive
treatment of the national accounts.  Such a treatment is given in Bartelmus et al (1993)
who note on page 111 that “non-renewable and renewable or potentially renewable
natural resources are suffering depletion and degradation, and the environmental quality
of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems is deteriorating”.
The Bartelmus et al study come to the conclusion that depletion of natural resources in
1985 amounted to 74.1 million kina – this being equivalent to 31 percent of the sectoral
value added while the corresponding figures for 1990 were 180.7 million kina and 47.8
percent (Table 7-6, page 117).  When environmental effects are netted out together with
the depletion of the natural resource, GDP for the mining sector for 1989 is reduced to
26.5 percent of the gross amount (Table 7-13, page 128).  The large and growing resource
sector, albeit amounting to liquidation of national capital, funded consumption that in
most years has exceeded production.  This last observation is consistent with that made in
Hunt (1998) and is in sharp contradiction to the Hartwick rule as shown by condition (5b)
above.  Hence, mining in PNG has failed to transform its natural resources in alternative
form of capital; the clear policy implication being that for sustainable development, such
a transformation is necessary.
 ii. The case of logging
Logging, particularly of native forests, though theoretically a renewable resource could
be interpreted as intermediate between the extremes of non-renewable and renewable
natural resources.  While on the one hand, the native forests have the potential for
                                                                
2 This data has been derived from Bank of Papua New Guinea Quarterly Economic Bulletin , various issues.
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regeneration, the time required for such regrowth (anything up to 100 years) and
prevailing discount rates imply that this resource may, for all practical purposes, be
considered as exhaustible.  In other words, current trends in logging suggest that this
resource has little if any chance of regeneration.  Given the above, it is perhaps wise to
consider forest resources and threatened species as being a finite stock that declines at the
rate of extraction as shown by equation (3) above.
Condition (5d) can be rearranged to read as
(5d’) )( ss gf +=- fry
y&
.
In steady state, the discount rate is negatively related to the shadow price of the resource
extracted.  The discount rate, reflected in interest rates charged on funds invested in the
domestic resource sector, now determines the price of the resource.  In the case where the
resource is of a homogeneous quality, higher interest rates lower investments in the sector
by lowering the value of investments.  In the more realistic case of resources of varying
qualities, the higher interest rate leads to high-grading, defined as the process whereby
the best quality resource is extracted first, since only the better quality resources (ie those
with larger rents) satisfy condition (5d’) above.  High interest rates over the recent past in
several Pacific Island states due to a combination of macroeconomic stress, political
instability, and/or in situations of insecurity of access to the resource have lowered
investments in fresh resource discoveries as well as increased high grading from projects
in operation. 3
                                                                
3 See Chapter 12 of Garnaut and Ross, 1983 on ‘Economic stability and the timing of mineral investment,
production, and revenue’ and Duncan, 2001 for the more recent case of a sharp decline in new investments
in resource projects in PNG.
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Logging in Solomon Islands over the last decade has been high despite falling world
price for logs.  Recent episodes of political and macroeconomic instability have led to
logging well above the sustainable levels; this could be due to the higher discount rates
together with the need for foreign exchange.  A higher rate of high grading follows in
such circumstances.  The above is in contradiction with condition (5d) that states the
efficient extraction path for the resource.  The policy lesson from the above is that
macroeconomic instability and insecurity of secure access to a resource will lead to
inefficient extraction; such an outcome will be inconsistent with natural resource
management for sustainable development.
Secure long-term access to native forests in the PICs is hampered by communal
ownership often governed by traditional institutions where access rights to a particular
forest differs between clans such that one clan may have the rights to hunt on the land,
another may have the right to hunt and collect firewood, while yet a third may have the
rights to hunt, collect firewood, and garden on the land.  Such diffused and often
undocumented rights create problems of open access providing little incentives for
conservation of the resource.  In such a situation, resource extraction proceeds at rates
higher than what would prevail with secure and exclusive property rights, raising the
chances of depletion - ceteris paribus - of an otherwise renewable resource.  This is
another manifestation of inefficient entry driven by resource rents in a climate of insecure
property rights (a la Horstman and Markusen, 1986).  Such entry dissipates all of the
rents, depriving society of the scarcity values of the resource.  In the context of PICs,
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Duncan and Temu (1997) note that “Assignment of the right to sign logging contracts to
tribal chiefs or ‘big men’ has led to a situation where rights to harvest are granted by
landowners in return for a pittance, in terms of their share of the revenue in excess of
logging costs” (page 176).  Sometimes side-payments, often illegal, enable extraction of
part of the rents by some of the owners but this is at a cost of rent seeking and
unproductive activity.  The above outcomes result from a lack of clear property rights to
forests, this in turn will fail to realise any of the efficiency conditions listed in equations
(5a) to (5d) above.  The policy implication from the above is that property rights have to
be established as a prerequisite to better management of natural resources.
 iii. The case of regional fisheries
Fisheries, particularly that for tuna by distant water fishing nations, exemplifies the case
of renewable resource extraction.  Much of the inshore fisheries in the PICs are for
subsistence use.  Sustainable use of this resource is attempted, and with mixed success,
by a combination of state and local regulation, including those emanating from
traditions.4  Here, we confine our attention to tuna fisheries given its regional character,
size in terms of its potential contribution to development, problems of open access, and
participation of distant water fishing nations (DWFNs).  Petersen in this volume provides
a detailed treatment of governance issues in respect of tuna fisheries of the region; here
the focus is on current practice vis-à-vis the ideals from the model presented in the last
section.
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The EEZs provide the PICs, as the coastal states, private property over a large span of the
Pacific Ocean.  Article 56 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea gives the PICs
“sovereign rights for the purpose of … exploiting, conserving and managing natural
resources, whether living or non-living…”.  But this leaves the issue of the rights to the
highly migratory tuna species unsettled.  Distant water fishing nations, the US in
particular, have consistently argued that highly migratory species should remain
international common property to be managed by international organisations, where both
the coastal states and the DWFNs have significant roles.  Article 64 of the Convention
states that relevant coastal states should cooperate with DWFNs with the latter given the
responsibility to assist in establishment of the so-called “Article 64 organisations”
(Kaitala and Munro, 1993).
Given that the EEZs of the PICs stretch to the high seas, management of the highly
migratory tuna stocks that move between the EEZs and the (contiguous) adjacent high
seas poses several challenges for policy makers.  The challenges include maximising
rents from the resource, ensuring sustainable harvests, and maintaining cooperation both
amongst the PICs and between the PICs and DWFNs as per Article 64.  These
challenges, together with a lack of capacity to enforce regulations within the EEZs of
individual PICs, has seriously eroded private property rights to the resource.  The ensuing
lack of collective control over harvesting of tuna has the potential to lead to problems of
open access where open access resources are characterised by collective ownership in an
environment where the resource is exploited under individualistic competition.  Such
                                                                                                                                                                                                
4 There are some exceptions where the resource has been degraded and in the extreme case, depleted.  For
example, recent measures of coliform contamination of water and shellfish in Tarawa Lagoon in Kiribati
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institutional arrangements often lead to over-exploitation of the resource.  More
importantly, open access equilibrium by its competitive nature, leads to dissipation of all
rents to zero5 – this result is due to the free or open access to the resource which is
equivalent to assuming a lack of (enforceable) property rights to the resource.
Consequently, none of the conditions listed in equations (5a) to (5d) are likely to be
satisfied leading to a failure to efficiently manage the tuna resource for sustainable
development.
The economics of the management of such shared fishery resources offers several lessons
to policy makers.  For example, free entry into the resource leads to a dissipation of all
rents and leads to exploitation above what would prevail under a monopoly.  Such
unrestricted access has the potential for crowding diseconomies, where the effort of one
competitor raises costs of fishing to another, leading to waste of capital.  Many models
that try to capture the dynamics of a non-cooperative management of a shared resource
consistently show that the results are akin to those from the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ game
where the fishery is driven to the common bionomic equilibrium with all economic rents
being dissipated away.
The above would suggest that cooperative management of tuna is the only sensible
option.  Modelling cooperative games where the DWFN and coastal states cooperate to
ensure sustainable harvests via agreeing to a total allowable catch (TAC) based on
scientific research, poses the added challenge to agree on a rent-sharing mechanism.  The
                                                                                                                                                                                                
shows levels in excess of acceptable standards (Biosystems, 1995).
5 This is a restatement of the zero-profit condition.
16
application of the two-player Nash game with binding agreements and in the absence of
side-payments will deliver rents determined solely by fishing effort with crowding
diseconomies being a symptom.  An alternative regime where the TAC is divided
between the stakeholders on the basis of an agreed and transparent formula that then is
traded in a competitive environment has the potential to satisfy all of the four conditions
listed as equations (5a) to (5d) above.
Achieving efficient use of tuna resources given current position involves following the
enumerated four steps and in the given sequence.  First, a TAC is established on the basis
of scientific evidence.  Next, a formula for distribution of this TAC between the
stakeholders is established.  Third, the individual PIC’s-share of the TAC is traded in a
competitive market.  A comparison of the above ideal with current practice is not too
promising.  On the first, there is little knowledge of sustainable yields with the rapid
decline in two species of tuna, namely big-eye and yellow fin, suggesting that harvesting
beyond regenerative capacity may already be a problem (see Petersen in this volume).
The South Pacific Community (SPC) undertakes such studies, the findings of which are
confidential.  Access to tuna fisheries is currently given by individual PICs to their EEZs,
a recipe leading to the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma game.  Individual PICs monitor
and regulate fishing effort as an instrument to contain catches to sustainable levels; this
then exacerbates problems of under-reporting of catches and existing inefficiencies in use
of capital (see Duncan and Temu, 1997 and ADB, 2000).
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Some policy implications
Three specific cases of resource extraction - those for mining, logging, and fishing – have
been used to illustrate the gaps in current practice against the ideals from a model that
treats natural resources as capital.  The general lessons on better management of natural
resources from the above include the following.
First, property rights must be established such that competition delivers on condition (5a)
where the marginal benefit of resource extraction is equal to the opportunity cost of such
activity.  Lack of clear and exclusive property rights in respect of several natural
resources is likely to hamper the achievement of this basic and necessary condition for
efficient resource use.  Second, the rents from resource extraction must be invested such
that the liquidated natural capital is transformed into an alternative from of capital such
that the aggregate stock of capital of the community is protected from falling.  The above
constitutes the Hartwick-rule.  Mining in PNG has failed to adhere strictly to this rule
given that some of the resource rents have been consumed.6  Indeed PNG compares
favourably with other PICs in terms of management of resource rents, the recent
squandering of phosphate reserves of Nauru being a good case in point.  Last, condition
(5d) states the efficient extraction path for a resource.  As the ideal, it states that the rate
of resource extraction should be determined by equating benefits of such extraction as
reflected by the price of the resource against the costs of such extraction inclusive of
costs of depletion.  This, named the Hotelling’s rule, is most difficult to implement for
two reasons: first, forecasting commodity prices has had very little success; and second,
                                                                
6 The national accounts treat expenditure on education and health as consumption; these in the framework
used here would constitute investments.
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resource projects have long gestation lags before coming on stream.  The most that the
policymaker can do with respect to condition (5d) is to ensure an environment conducive
to long-term investment such that incentives for efficient extraction of resources are
maintained.  Consequently, the persistent policy and political instability within several of
the PICs is a serious impediment to better resource management.
Conclusion
This chapter has benchmarked current practices in management of mining, logging, and
offshore fisheries in the Pacific Islands against the ideals set by a simple resource model.
The analysis suggests large policy and institutional gaps that potentially can be rectified.
For example, current practices suggest that liquidation of mineral wealth in Papua New
Guinea has not been fully utilised to produce alternative capital as suggested by the
Hartwick rule.  This rule states that economic rents from exploitation of any natural
capital should be invested in an alternative form of capital and possibly in one that gives
an even higher return.  Given that PNG is perhaps better than most of the PICs in
resource management, it can be safely assumed that a lot remains to be done in terms of
management of mineral resources within the region.  A similar claim can be made for
logging and tuna fisheries as well.
Additional considerations as those relating to uncertainties about resource stock sizes,
extraction costs, availability of substitutes and new (more efficient) technology raise the
need for additional information in better management of resources.  The least the policy
maker can do is to provide policy stability so as to encourage investors in resource
19
projects to take a longer-term view on their investments.  Furthermore, the presence of
resources of varying qualities in an environment where prices reflect the scarcity values
of the resource will ensure efficient use of the resource.  Here, scarcity value reflects the
real opportunity cost of acquiring an additional quantity of the resource; hence, if the
resource has few substitutes, implying a high choke-price, the high price will ensure an
efficient extraction path.  The last follows from the Hotelling’s rule as depicted in
condition (5d) above.
The presence of externalities, including the social value of preservation of bio-diversity,
the impact of native vegetation on soil fertility and erosion, and the amenity value of
natural habitats drive a wedge between social and private valuations of natural resources
including native forests.  These add another further complications to the management of
natural resources, but this issue is beyond the purview of this chapter.
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Table 1: Resource dependence
Nation/ State Land per capita
(hectares)
EEZ (‘000 km2) Primary
exports/total exports
(per cent)f
American Samoaa 0.31 390 na
Cook Islands 1.25 1830 77
Fiji 2.24 1290 27
FSM 0.53 2978 93
Guama 0.35 218 na
Kiribati 0.98 3550 66
Marshall Islands 0.29 2131 37
Nauru 0.19 320 na
New Caledoniab 9.55 1740 na
Niuec 13.00 390 na
Palau 2.87 629 na
Papua New Guinea 9.26 3120 71
Samoad 1.65 120 25
Solomon Islands 6.87 1340 92
Tokelaue 0.67 290 na
Tonga 0.73 700 71
Tuvalu 0.26 900 25
Vanuatu 8.34 680 69
Notes:a territory of the US; administered by the Office of Insular Affairs, US
Department of the Interior; b is a French Overseas Territory; c self-governing in free
association with New Zealand with Niue fully responsible for internal affairs while New
Zealand retains all responsibility for management of external affairs; d this is by count on
the map of the major islands; e is a territory of New Zealand; f this is the ratio of
agricultural and mineral exports as a proportion of total merchandise exports which could
be interpreted as proportion of non-manufactured merchandise exports – data for the
latest year available. Sources: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ and
http://www.mpt.travel-guides.com/data/ncl/ncl.asp; Asian Development Bank Key Indicators
2001.
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Table 2: Basic statistics on Pacific Island Countries (PICs).
Population
(000s)
Popln
Growth (%
per annum)
GDP per
capita:, $US
GDP Growth
(% per
annum)
Adult
literacy
(%)
Infant
mortality,
per 1000
live births
life
expectancy
Cook Islands 19 0.65 4521 n.a. 100
(1994-7)
25
(1998)
69
((1991-3)
Fiji 825 1.24 1,982 -3.7
(1998)
92
(1995)
19
(1998)
72.7
(1998)
Kiribati 91 1.42 594 6.1
(1998)
97
(1999)
58
(1998)
60.9
(1998)
Marshall Islands 62 3.21 1,509 3.7
(1995)
91
(1999)
26
(1998)
62.8
(1994-7)
Micronesia, Fed St 118 2.03 1,841 0.3
(1999)
81
(1999)
28.5
(1998)
67.3
(1998)
Nauru 12 1.85 2,900 n.a. 90
(1999)
26
(1994-7)
60.8
(2000
est.)
Niue 2 0.90
(1994-7)
2,250 n.a. 99
(1991-3)
18
(1994)
66
(1994-7)
Palau 19 2.41 6,448 n.a. 98
(1999)
19
(1995)
71
(1996)
Papua New
Guinea
4807 2.22 756 0.9
(1999)
72
(1995)
59.4
(1998)
58.2
(1998)
Samoa 169 1.43 1,255 1.3
(1998)
98
(1999)
25
(1998)
68.7
(1998)
Solomon Islands 448 3.14 712 4.0
(1999)
62
(1999)
22.2
(1998)
70.8
(1998)
Tonga 100 0.28 1,614 2.2
(1999)
95.9
(1991-3)
21.3
(1998)
70.6
(1998)
Tuvalu 10 2.69 1,215 n.a. 99.5
(1991-3)
29
(1997)
65.6
(1991-3)
Vanuatu 200 2.41 1,276 -2.0
(1999)
70
(1989-
90)
35.5
(1998)
65
(1998)
Notes: The population figures are projections for mid-2000; population growth data is for 1999; GDP-per
capita data is for 1998; the data on adult literacy rates are for the most recent year available as indicated in
the parenthesis; and, a data for 1998, the most recent available.  Electronic databases of the following
organisations were used to extract the above data: South Pacific Trade Directory, UNESCAP, UNESCO,
UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank .
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